

Verifying Protocol Conformance on the fly by using SC-IFF proof procedure

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14 Luglio 2004


Open Societies of agents/computees

- Open societies
 - agents/computees are heterogeneous
 - no assumptions on the behaviour of agents
 - observation of external behaviour of agents (interactions)
- Interactions
 - agent communication language
 - interaction protocols
 - **issues:** formal specification, verification of compliance

Aims of the Society model


- **Use of a declarative and CL-based representation for the specification of ACL/protocols**
- **Uniform computational model to understand different aspects of interaction in an open and global environment**
- **Support goal-directed behaviour of societies**
- **Corresponding operational model**
- **Possibility to verify interactions, and prove properties**

Compliance Verification



Social infrastructure

Social Infrastructure




Knowledge Representation

<SOKB, SEKB, IC_s, Goals>

- SOKB: society knowledge base (roles and rules)
 - LP clauses with expectations
- SEKB: consists of
 - **History (HAP)**: set of *Happened* events that are “socially relevant” (e.g. communicative acts). *Ground facts of the kind*: $H(Event [, Time])$.
 - **EXP**: (positive or negative) **expectations on the correct (social) behaviour of members**: $[\neg] E(Event [, Time]) / [\neg] EN(Event [, Time])$
- IC_s: **protocol specification** by means of *integrity constraints (social semantics)*
- **Goals**: Society can be goal-directed
 - LP Goals

Social infrastructure



**(1) on-the fly verification of compliance
to protocols**

Social Integrity Constraints (ICs)

■ Example of Social Integrity Constraint

Society where agents can **exchange resources**:

*If I make you an offer, you are expected to answer to me by **either accepting or refusing** before a deadline d*

$H(\text{tell}(\text{Me}, \text{You}, \text{offer}(\text{Item}, \text{Price}), T) \rightarrow$

$E(\text{tell}(\text{You}, \text{Me}, \text{accept}(\text{Item}, \text{Price}), T'), T' \leq T + d \vee$

$E(\text{tell}(\text{You}, \text{Me}, \text{refuse}(\text{Item}, \text{Price}), T'), T' \leq T + d$


If you accept my offer, you are expected to not refuse it later

$H(\text{tell}(\text{You}, \text{Me}, \text{accept}(\text{Item}, \text{Price}), T) \rightarrow$

$EN(\text{tell}(\text{You}, \text{Me}, \text{refuse}(\text{Item}, \text{Price}), T_r), T_r \geq T$

Example (fulfilment)

yves



$H(\text{tell}(\text{yves}, \text{thomas}, \text{offer}(\text{scooter}, 10\$), 1))$

thomas



$E(\text{tell}(\text{thomas}, \text{yves}, \text{accept}(\text{scooter}, 10\$), T'), T' < 7)$


$\vee E(\text{tell}(\text{thomas}, \text{yves}, \text{refuse}(\text{scooter}, 10\$), T'), T' < 7)$

$H(\text{tell}(\text{thomas}, \text{yves}, \text{accept}(\text{scooter}, 10\$), 5))$

fulfillment!

Example (violation)

yves



$H(\text{tell}(\text{yves}, \text{thomas}, \text{offer}(\text{scooter}, 10\$), 1))$


thomas



$E(\text{tell}(\text{thomas}, \text{yves}, \text{accept}(\text{scooter}, 10\$), T'), T' < 7$


$\vee E(\text{tell}(\text{thomas}, \text{yves}, \text{refuse}(\text{scooter}, 10\$), T'), T' < 7$

violation!



Example (violation)

yves



H(tell(yves,thomas,offer(scooter,10\$),1)

thomas



H(tell(thomas,yves,**accept**(scooter,10\$),5)

H(tell(thomas,yves,accept(Item,Price), T)

EN(tell(thomas,yves,refuse(Item,Price), Tr), $Tr \geq T$)

H(tell(thomas,yves,**refuse**(scooter,10\$),8)

violation!

Society Instance as Abductive Logic Program

- Instance of a Society (S_{HAP}): ALP $\langle P, Ab, IC \rangle$ with
 - $P = SOKB \cup HAP$
 - $Ab = \{E, EN, \neg E, \neg EN\}$
 - $IC = IC_s$
- Consistency:
 - IC_s -Consistency
 - E-Consistency
 - \neg -Consistency
 - Fulfillment

Consistency

Given a society and a set HAP of events...

3. a set of expectations EXP is **IC_s-consistent** iff

$$\text{SOKB} \cup \text{HAP} \cup \text{EXP} \models \text{IC}_s$$
4. a set of expectations EXP is **E-consistent** iff

$$\{ E(p), \text{EN}(p) \} \not\subseteq \text{EXP}$$
5. a set of expectations EXP is **¬-consistent** iff

$$\{ E(p), \neg E(p) \} \not\subseteq \text{EXP}$$

$$\{ \text{EN}(p), \neg \text{EN}(p) \} \not\subseteq \text{EXP}$$
6. a (IC_s, E, ¬) consistent EXP is **fulfilled** iff

$$\text{HAP} \cup \text{EXP} \{ E(p) \rightarrow H(p) \} \cup \{ \text{EN}(p) \rightarrow \neg H(p) \} \models \perp$$
7. if no consistent set of expectations fulfilled exists, HAP produces a **violation** in the society

Society Constraint Proof Procedure (wrt IFF)

Called **SCIFF** (Society Constraint IFF)
Extends IFF.

New features:

- Accepts **new events** as they happen (incremental, dynamic)
- **Generates the expectations** E , not E , EN , not EN on the basis of behaviour of the members of a society and of IC_s .
- Verifies the correspondence between the happened events and the expected events (**fulfillment**)
- Identifies (as soon as possible) the situation where there is **violation** and/or **inconsistency**
- The abduced atoms may have variables **quantified** \forall and variables **quantified** \exists

Properties

- General properties (of the framework):
 - well-definedness of programs/ICs
 - termination of conformance checking (link to structural properties of ICs)
- Properties of interaction
 - mechanism viewpoint:
 - “general” properties (fairness, termination, ...)
 - “specific” (some proposition/formula holds): can be defined by way of ICs
???
 - agent viewpoint: conformance to protocols

General Society Properties

■ Termination of conformance checking

- aim: to identify classes of Societies (SOKB, ICs, G) for which, under *suitable syntactic conditions*, any execution of SCIFF terminates, given each possible history
- classes must be expressive enough to represent certain significant protocols, while guaranteeing termination of SCIFF.

■ Well-definedness of Societies

- aim: given a society (SOKB, ICs, G), to guarantee that, under certain hypotheses, this society will be well-defined, i.e., among its possible (closed) instances there exists at least one for which goal G is achieved.

■ Idea: use background from LP, e.g.:

- call-consistent normal LP $\Rightarrow \exists$ at least one (total) stable model
- stratified normal LP $\Rightarrow \exists$ exactly one (total) stable model
- acyclic ALP and query \Rightarrow termination

Examples

■ Not well-defined:

- Goal: g .
- SOKB: $g \leftarrow E(p), E(q)$.
- ICS: $E(p) \rightarrow EN(q)$.

Or:

- Goal: true.
- ICS: $H(p) \rightarrow EN(p)$.
Not $H(p) \rightarrow E(p)$.

■ Not terminating:

- ICS: $E(p(X)) \rightarrow E(p(f(X)))$.


Agent Compliance (wrt ICs), [Alberti et alii ENTCS2003]

- **Negative compliance:** A group of agents is negatively compliant to a set of social integrity constraints *iff* its members never produce a social event which is expected not to happen;
- **Positive compliance:** A group of agents is positively compliant to a set of social integrity constraints *iff* its members never fail to produce social events which are expected to happen;
- **Strong compliance:** A group of agents is strongly compliant to a set of social integrity constraints *iff* it is both negatively and positively compliant.
- **Compliance** is a property which can be verified *on-the-fly* (in open environments)

Agent Conformance (wrt Protocol) [Endriss et alii, AAMAS03]

- **Weak conformance** An agent is weakly conformant to a protocol P *iff* it never utters any illegal dialogue move (wrt. P)(negative?).
- **Exhaustive conformance** An agent is exhaustively conformant to a protocol P *iff* it is weakly conformant to P and it will utter at least one legal output move for any legal input of P it receives (strong?).
- An additional notion of conformance (*robust* conformance) is related to the behaviour of computees in the event of illegal incoming messages (FIPA not-understood).

Degrees of verification



Proving specific properties

- Related work: **model checking**.
 - Prove static properties on mechanism
 - E.g. Needham-Schroeder: protocol is prone to man-in-the-middle breaks
 - Need full knowledge about the mechanism
- Using SCIFF (open questions):
 - how to use model checking techniques in an open environment (partial information)?
 - how to extend SCIFF to achieve results comparable with those achieved by model checking techniques? (possible?)
 - idea: can SCIFF be used to generate compliant *histories* of events? (which formalism to synthesize compliant histories?)

Collaboration?

■ **Torino:** Logic-based protocols & DyLOG

- mentalistic approach (agents) vs. social approach (Society infrastructure)
- conformance:
 - investigate on the relationship between the different notions of conformance/compliance
- translation AUML-> DyLog:
 - It would be interesting to investigate if the approach used for the translation AUML ->DyLog could be extended for translating AUML specification into ICS
- from the implementation point of view: integration of DyLog and SOCS-SI

Ambito Applicativo

- **Analizzare e validare** i modelli e i linguaggi definiti in diversi scenari applicativi.
- Realizzazione di interazioni tra agenti basate su **dialoghi**, con particolare attenzione alla **negoziazione** per **l'allocazione di risorse**
- Esempio di test in SOCS: aste combinatorie, Net-Bill
- Sistemi di supporto alla **diagnosi medica** e di **verifica di protocolli** in campo medico (**linee guida**).

Demo!

- A simplified auction scenario will be presented.
- Auction protocol is defined thorough ICs. Amongst them:

*(1) If a computee makes a bid, the auctioneer is expected to answer by **either saying win or lose** before a deadline d*

$$\begin{aligned} &H(\text{tell}(\text{Bidder}, \text{Auctioneer}, \text{bid}(\text{Item}, \text{Price}), T) \rightarrow \\ &\quad E(\text{tell}(\text{Auctioneer}, \text{Bidder}, \text{win}(\text{Item}, \text{Price}), T'), T' \leq T+d \vee \\ &\quad E(\text{tell}(\text{Auctioneer}, \text{Bidder}, \text{lose}(\text{Item}, \text{Price}), T'), T' \leq T+d \end{aligned}$$

*(2) Once the auctioneer awards a bidder ("**win**"), the auctioneer is expected not to acknowledge the same bidder with "**lose**"*

$$\begin{aligned} &H(\text{tell}(\text{Auctioneer}, \text{Bidder}, \text{win}(\text{Item}, \text{Price}), T) \rightarrow \\ &\quad \text{EN}(\text{tell}(\text{Auctioneer}, \text{Bidder}, \text{lose}(\text{Item}, \text{Price}), T_r), T_r \geq T \end{aligned}$$

Demo!

- In the first run, a “compliance” history is shown.
- Agent *f* open an auction in order to get a taxi to a station
- Three taxi (*taxi1*, *taxi2*, *taxi3*) make a bid each.
- *f* notifies *taxi1* “win”, and to *taxi2* and *taxi3* it notifies “lose”

Demo!

- In the second run, a “wrong” interaction is shown.
- Same scenario as before, but this time the auctioneer *f* does not notify *taxi2* and *taxi3* “lose”
- As soon as the history is declared “closed” (no more events can happen anymore), SOCS-SI detects the violation due to the ICs:

$H(\text{tell}(\text{Bidder}, \text{Auctioneer}, \text{bid}(\text{Item}, \text{Price}), T) \rightarrow$

$E(\text{tell}(\text{Auctioneer}, \text{Bidder}, \text{win}(\text{Item}, \text{Price}), T'), T' \leq T+d$

\vee

$E(\text{tell}(\text{Auctioneer}, \text{Bidder}, \text{lose}(\text{Item}, \text{Price}), T'), T' \leq T+d$

Goal Achievability

- Society can be goal-directed
- Given an instance of a society S_{HAP} with (open/closed) history, a goal G is **achievable** in S_{HAP} iff there exists an (open/closed) consistent fulfilled set of expectations EXP s.t.:

$$SOKB \cup EXP \cup HAP \models G$$

- We write:

$$S_{HAP} \models_{EXP} G$$

i.e.,

$$Comp(SOKB \cup EXP) \cup HAP \cup CET \models G$$

Operational Semantics

- Based on IFF
- Data structure

$$T = \langle R, CS, PSIC, EXP, HAP, FULF, VIOL \rangle$$

Where

- R: Conjunction of literals
- CS: CLP-Constraint Store
- PSIC: Partially solved IC_s
- EXP: (Pending) Expectations
- FULF: Fulfilled expectations
- VIOL: Violated Expectations

Derivation

■ Initial Node

$$T_0 = \langle \{G\}, \emptyset, IC_s, \emptyset, S_{HAP_i}, \emptyset, \emptyset \rangle$$

(may start with a non-empty history HAP_i)

■ Derivation $T_0 \rightarrow T_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow T_n$ (quiescence)

■ Successful derivation:

— Final node: $T_n = \langle \emptyset, CS, PSIC, EXP, HAP_f, FULF, \emptyset \rangle$

— written $S_{HAP_i} \mid \sim_{EXP \cup FULF}^{HAP_f} G$

Transitions

- IFF-Like (extended)
- Dynamically growing history
- Fulfillment, violation
- Consistency
- CLP

Soundness

- **Soundness.** Given a society instance $S_{\text{HAP}i}$, if

$$S_{\text{HAP}i} \mid \sim_{\text{EXP} \cup \text{FULF}}^{\text{HAP}f} G$$

with expectation answer $(\text{EXP} \cup \text{FULF}, \sigma)$ then

$$S_{\text{HAP}f} \mid \approx_{(\text{EXP} \cup \text{FULF})\sigma} G\sigma$$

- **Proved under**
 - allowedness conditions
 - without abducibles quantified \forall
 - Extendable to quantified \forall (sketched, see lemma to abducibles quantified \forall)

Soundness: scheme of proof

- Based on Soundness of IFF
 - In both cases of *open* and *closed* history



Prolog/CHR-based Implementation of SCIFF

- **(Attributed) Variables**
 - Quantification (exist, forall) in attributes
 - Ad-hoc constraint solver for unification
- **Implementation of Data Structures**
 - R as the Prolog resolvent
 - CS as CLP stores (CLPFD, CLPB)
 - PSIC,EXP,HAP,FULF,VIOL implemented as CHR constraints
- **Implementation of Transitions**
 - Most (propagation, fulfillment/violation, consistency...) as CHR rules
 - CLP: delegated to the solvers